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INTRODUCTION
Julius Henry Cohen was a man concerned with the social good. He
understood law to have a place in our thinking about that subject. He
also understood the professional practice associated with it to be an
activity different in kind from the practice of commerce. Given these
dispositions, Cohen was quite naturally concerned about the growing
influence of commercialism on the practice of law in his time, namely
early twentieth century industrial America. Accordingly, Cohen
expressed his reservations in his 1916 publication The Law: Business
or Profession?,1 the purpose of which was to challenge the
commercialization of the practice of law and, correspondingly, to
defend a vision of lawyering as a profession.2

∗ Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. A.B. 1989, Stanford
University; J.D. 1994, Yale Law School. I would like to thank Jenny Roberts and
David Driesen for comments on the draft of this paper. I would also like to thank the
participants in the conference “The Law: Business or Profession? The Continuing
Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of Law in the Twenty-First
Century,” including William Nelson and David Luban who served as commentators
on the draft paper, for their remarks. Finally, I thank Kathryn J. Cooperman for her
research assistance. © 2012 Rakesh K. Anand. All rights reserved.
1. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (1916)
2. For a discussion of Cohen’s vision, see Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius

Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the
Discourse of Early Twentieth Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
1 (2005).
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For me, Cohen’s work remains relevant principally because I share
his starting points in my thinking about law and its professional
practice today.
I, too, am concerned with the social good.
Additionally, I understand law to speak to that subject and consider
the practice of law to be a pursuit that is qualitatively distinct from
the practice of commerce. And, in this light, the present increasing
sway of commercialism over the practice of law likewise disturbs me.
Unlike Cohen, however, my apprehension about the rising impact of
commercialism on lawyering does not lead me to address the
business/profession dichotomy—at least not directly. Rather, my
worry about commercialism’s mounting influence on the practice of
law points me in a different direction. Specifically, it leads me to
attend to a broad social issue: commercialism’s growing impact on
society as a whole and how we might think about law and the role for
lawyers in light of this state of affairs. For me, this matter is the
context within which to explore the proper relationship between
commercialism and the practice of law because it is, in my opinion, a
more pressing social concern than the subject of the practice of law’s
character as a profession and its beneficial role, as such, in a
democracy. Accordingly, in this Essay, I depart from Cohen’s
principal focus and take up this broad social issue.
Importantly, in doing so, I proceed from a distinct perspective on
the essential character of commercialism and law. Specifically, I
understand each to be a cultural practice of a set of ideas and, as such,
to be a way of knowing, or being in, the world, at least in the United
States. To speak in a slightly more technical vocabulary, I understand
each to be, for Americans, a “cultural form” of enterprise—a cultural
activity that affords an entry point into that which surrounds the
individual, a means in and through which he or she organizes and
comprehends experience—and to be aptly categorized alongside
other cultural forms that Americans engage, for example religion,
science, and art.3 Necessarily, this disposition toward the essential
3. For a discussion of religious practice as a cultural enterprise, see generally
PETER BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF
RELIGION (1967). For a discussion of art as a cultural enterprise, see ERNST
CASSIRER, AN ESSAY ON MAN: AN INTRODUCTION TO A PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN
CULTURE 137–70 (1944). The intellectual history of physics suggests its nature as a
cultural enterprise. For a treatment of this history, see generally ALBERT EINSTEIN &
LEOPOLD INFELD, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS (1938). Today, string theory (perhaps
more specifically M-theory) offers a new alternative to both relativity theory and
standard quantum theory. For an introduction to string theory, see BRIAN GREENE,
THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE: SUPERSTRINGS, HIDDEN DIMENSIONS, AND THE QUEST FOR
THE ULTIMATE THEORY (1999). It is perhaps necessary to state that characterizing
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character of commercialism and law informs my approach to the
question presented. For me, the subject to be addressed is the
growing influence of the cultural form of commercialism on society as
a whole—or, more precisely, the growing influence of the cultural
form of economics,4 commercialism being the practice of a set of
economic ideas5—and how we might think about the cultural form of
law and the role for its most representative figures in light of this state
of affairs. The discourse that follows reflects this orientation toward
the subject matter (which is, to be precise, a philosophicalanthropological one).6

science as a cultural practice is not a denial of scientific observation. It is only a
statement that a difference exists between scientific observation and the meaning that
we ascribe to such observation.
4. The references to economics throughout this Essay pertain to neo-classical
economics. Both capitalist and non-capitalist alternatives to neo-classical economic
theory exist. Capitalist approaches to the economic order that are not neo-classical
in form include traditional institutionalist economics. For an introduction to
institutional economic theory, see, e.g., GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, What Is the
Essence of Institutional Economics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN
ANTHOLOGY 399 (David M. Hausman ed., 3d ed. 2008) and Walter H. Hamilton, The
Institutional Approach to Economic Theory, 9 AM. ECON. REV. (SUPPLEMENT) 309–
18 (1919). See also JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1934); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE
CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS (1899). Non-capitalist approaches to
economic production include those grounded in a Marxist ideology, as well as those
rooted in the ideology of Gross National Happiness. For an introduction to the
former, see THE MARX-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). For an
introduction to the latter, see Mark Mancall, Gross National Happiness and
Development: An Essay, in GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS AND DEVELOPMENT:
PROCEEDINGS
OF
THE
FIRST
INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE
ON
OPERATIONALIZATION OF GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS 1 (Karma Ura & Karma
Galay eds., 2004).
5. Cf. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 7–8 (Cosimo
Classics 2005) (1904) (describing the business enterprise as the “directing force” that
animates the modern industrial system and the modern industrial system as the
“material framework of modern civilization”).
6. Economists themselves acknowledge that economics is a way of approaching
the individual and the larger reality within which he or she operates. See, e.g., GARY
S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3 (1976). For an
interesting discussion that acknowledges economics as “a way of looking at the
world,” but resists defining it as a form of knowledge, see RONALD H. COASE,
Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, in ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS
34 (1994). At the same time, however, economists do not necessarily acknowledge
that economics is an ordering of things that individuals internalize, at least in the
United States.
In fact, neo-classical economic theorists claim a focus on
predictability, as opposed to descriptive accuracy. They also disclaim a normative
dimension to their analysis. For the most well-known statement, and defense, of neoclassical economics’ predictive orientation, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, The
Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953).
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In summary form, the discourse makes three points. It explains
that (a) illustrative of the social concern that motivates this Essay, the
cultural form of economics occupies a significant place in the
American political order, one that has a pronounced, negative effect
on society;7 (b) the cultural form of law offers the hope of an
alternative mode of being in and through which to engage political
life, one that provides for a more healthy social condition and,
correspondingly, a space in and through which to resist the cultural
form of economics and its negative social effects; and (c) the role for
the lawyer in America today is to help realize the promise of the
cultural form of law and, correspondingly, push against the
manifestation of the cultural form of economics and its detrimental
social consequences. As this summary description indicates, the
broad message of the discourse is that cause for concern exists—the
American embrace of the cultural form of economics has put the
political order in a bad place and, thus, the social situation is a
troubled one—and the cultural form of law and the legal profession
represent a locus within which to assist society in moving in the
direction of change.
Quite naturally, this broad message speaks to my purpose in
presenting the discourse. In a small way, I hope to help increase
awareness in American society of the problems resident in its politics
and to identify one space within which Americans can begin to
address them. Ernst Cassirer argued that philosophy must ultimately
relate itself to the world and, correspondingly, that it had an ethical
task—loosely speaking, to guide humanity and make man aware of
the social problems of his time.8 Karl Marx offered a variation on this
thesis when he famously stated that the point of philosophy is to

For an important response, see Ronald H. Coase, How Should Economists Choose?,
in COASE, supra, at 15.
On law in America as a cultural practice, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY
OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999) and Paul W. Kahn,
Freedom, Autonomy, and the Cultural Study of Law, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 141
(2001).
7. For a recent discussion of economic psychology and contemporary American
society, one with points of contact with this essay, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT
MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012).
8. ERNST CASSIRER, The Concept of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem, in
SYMBOL, MYTH, AND CULTURE: ESSAYS AND LECTURES OF ERNST CASSIRER 1935–
1945, at 49–63 (Donald Phillip Verene ed., 1979); see also, Donald Phillip Verene,
Introduction to THORA ILIN BAYER, CASSIRER’S METAPHYSICS OF SYMBOLIC FORMS
28–37 (2001) (describing the normative dimension of Cassirer’s Philosophy of
Symbolic Forms).
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change the world.9 I present my observations in the spirit of these
thoughts.
Before proceeding with the discussion, a few brief comments are
necessary to ensure the clarity of my remarks—to make plain what I
am and am not saying. First, my concern with, and reflection on, the
rise of the cultural form of economics in American society is an
apprehension over, and consideration of, the increased dominance of
a market psychology in the extant political order of America. That is,
the impetus for the discourse, and the object of inquiry, is a growing
social disposition and associated pattern of behavior in the United
States. It is not instrumental institutions, namely markets, per se.
Markets themselves, and specifically the questions of whether they
have a place in the political order and, if so, the extent to which they
do, are not subjects that I take up. Nothing in this Essay is intended
to suggest otherwise.
Second, my focus on the growing influence of the cultural form of
economics in America today ultimately reflects the identification of
one important factor contributing to a negative social condition.
Arguably, it is the most significant factor, particularly at the broad
level at which I direct my attention. It is not, however, the only one.
Other elements of social life negatively impact contemporary
America’s politics. For example, while advancements in technology
have greatly improved social life in many respects, they also have
their deleterious effects. Nothing that follows should be read as a
denial of the existence of such other forces.
Third, the discussion that follows reflects a consideration of the
present social circumstance and the opportunity associated with the
cultural practice of law. It does not speak to how we might think
about the other cultural practices that Americans take up—whether
those that speak to the political sphere of experience or otherwise—
and the role for their most representative figures with respect to this
same phenomenon. In this way, the discourse is narrowly drawn and
engages one slice—the slice about which it makes sense for me to
speak—of an ultimately broad question. Necessarily, that broad
question is left aside.10
9. Karl Marx, Theses on Fuerbach, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 145 (Robert
C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
10. A final comment about my remarks speaks to its historical character. As is
commonly recognized, today we live in an age where the modern form of politics,
namely that of the nation-state, confronts a post-modern form of politics, namely that
of globalization. And, as others have also noted, the United States remains tied to
the former and, in a significant manner, resists the embrace of the latter.
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I. THE CULTURAL FORM OF ECONOMICS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY T ODAY
The starting point of the discourse is the influence that the cultural
form of economics has on contemporary American society—the place
that the cultural form of economics occupies in American political
space. And that discussion begins with an explication of the cultural
form itself. The first step in comprehending the present relationship
of the economic way of life to the American political order is
understanding what the economic manner of living looks like and, in
light of the motivating concerns of this Essay, what the central
pathologies associated with the form of being are. Only if we have a
picture of what it means to experience the world “economically,” one
that reveals the way of life’s main unhealthy features, can we grasp
the hold that the cultural form of economics has on America today.
At its core, the cultural form of economics is organized around four
ideas. Taken together, these ideas provide the requisite insights.
The first idea reflects the metaphysical orientation of the cultural
form of economics and is, accordingly, the true starting point of the
economic way of life. That idea is the sovereignty of the market. For
the economic way of being, the market reigns. It possesses a
transcendental character and, correspondingly, stands as a sort of lord
over the world.11 The market has existential primacy and is that
Understanding law in the United States as a cultural form and denoting the hope it
can afford America today is consistent with the present state of America’s politics. It
is an account of law in a political community that is still committed to the nation-state
model of individual and collective governance. To the extent that this circumstance
changes—that is, to the extent that the American political community fundamentally
embraces a more global model of politics—the discourse on law presented here will
decrease in relevance.
To be clear, in the event that such a turn in American politics occurs, the concern
with the cultural form of economics will remain. Projecting the cultural form of
economics across populations is central to the neo-liberal project. Similarly, the
question of how to think about law in light of the cultural form’s influence on society
will presumably maintain its currency. If history is any indication, law will have a
strong hold on the Western political imagination in the years to come. The
conception of law that will inform our discourse, however, will not be that of a
cultural form (at least as presently constituted). Necessarily, it will be something
else. What that alternate conception of law will—or at least should—be is unclear.
Indeed, in consideration of such a possible political future, we might begin to ask
“What should the law become?” For an introduction to historical conceptions of law,
see CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 1963).
11. For a reference to the transcendental character of the market, see Mancall,
supra note 4, at 19. Cf. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 485 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (“In bourgeois society, capital is
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which ultimately orders things. In the economic way of life, the
“invisible hand” of the market governs, providing direction and
stability to human behavior.
In exercising its sovereignty, the market rules in a particular
manner. Specifically, the market is a “pricing mechanism” that
establishes a value—a “market value”—for the objects of individual
interest. Market governance occurs in and through this pricing
mechanism, coordinating the satisfaction of interests.12 The sovereign
character of the market, coupled with this specific character of its
governance, points to the second idea that lies at the heart of the
cultural form of economics, one that stands as a corollary to the
market’s existential preeminence. For the economic mode of being,
the sovereign market’s orientation toward the satisfaction of interests
means that interests have ontological integrity. They exist in and of
themselves and have their own essence. For the economic way of life,
they are “things-in-themselves.”13
In a world in which the market reigns and interests are
correspondingly reified, we should expect an understanding of self
and other to be constructed in a manner that aligns with these initial
dispositions. In the cultural form of economics, they are. The
concepts of self and other resident in the economic way of life reflect
its market and interest-centered orientation. Not surprisingly, these
concepts are also basic to the cultural form of economics. They
represent the third and fourth foundational ideas.
With respect to the understanding of the self, for the economic
mode of living, the individual is the space within which interests
manifest themselves. That is, the individual is a matrix of interests.
More precisely, he or she is a locus of calculation for the satisfaction
of interests. For the economic form of being, the individual is a
computational mechanism that operates to fulfill desires as much as
possible. In the technical vocabulary of the cultural form, he or she is
a “decision unit”14 that “maximizes” the realization of wants (a
independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no
individuality.”).
12. Technically, there is a limiting circumstance of market rule, which is market
failure. In this situation, the government or the firm takes the place of the market as
the mechanism for coordinating behavior. On the firm as an alternative to the
market, see RONALD H. COASE, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET
AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
13. My intention is not to suggest a direct connection with the Kantian use of the
term “thing-in-itself.” For the relevant text of Kant, see IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE
OF PURE REASON (F. Max Müller trans., Anchor Books 1966) (1781).
14. Becker, supra note 6, at 7.
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process that occurs “rationally” through the assessment of
“opportunity costs,” the engagement of “cost-benefit analyses,” and
the taking up of “efficient” action, among other things).
Reciprocally, if the individual is a locus of calculation for the
satisfaction of interests, then he or she will apprehend the other in
terms of its desirability. This fact suggests the understanding of the
other to which the cultural form of economics adheres. For the
economic way of life, everything that the individual encounters in the
world is an object of interest.
All are “goods”15—items for
consumption.
The understanding of the cultural form of economics that emerges
from the description of its organizing ideas is that of a marketgoverned and interest-based mode of being in which self and other
are conceptualized in terms of its overarching interest basis. And,
with this portrait of the cultural form of economics in hand, we can
reflect on its essential character and ask what it is that we see.
Almost immediately, a problem with the cultural form presents itself,
a problem that points to a true disturbance of being: the way of life
subscribes to an understanding of self and other that lies outside the
bounds of any legitimate interpretation. That is, it sees self and other
in a manner that does not comport with human reason. As indicated,
the economic mode of living approaches the self in computational
terms oriented around personal desire and the other in the
vocabulary of self-utilization. Yet, neither of these conceptualizations
is sensible. At his or her core, the individual is not a locus of
calculation for the satisfaction of interests. Equally, most things are
not primarily objects of interest, at least not typically. Self and other
may look differently to different people, both within and across time.
Self and other appear, and have appeared, in a variety of ways. But it
is a mistake in thought to comprehend each in the market- and
interest-oriented manner that the cultural form of economics adopts.16
15. The term often used in economic circles is “resource,” with academic concern
focused on “scarce resources.” For a simple discussion of scarce resources, see
DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1–2
(2005).
16. On this point, one can consider the words of former Brazilian Secretary of the
Environment Jose Lutzenberger in reply to former World Bank Chief Economist
Larry Summers’s famous statement that “the economic logic behind dumping a load
of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable.” In a letter to Summers,
Lutzenberger wrote, in pertinent part: “Your reasoning is perfectly logical but totally
insane . . . . Your thoughts [provide] a concrete example of the unbelievable
alienation, reductionist thinking, social ruthlessness and the arrogant ignorance of
many conventional ‘economists’ concerning the nature of the world we live in.” For
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Two genuine pathologies of the soul follow from this mistake in
thought. Preliminarily, the mistake in thought leads to a basic
misunderstanding of the world as well as of how to think about it and,
accordingly, gives rise to an uneducated life. In understanding self
and other as, respectively, a locus of calculation for the satisfaction of
interest and an item for consumption, the cultural form of economics
builds a relationship to reality that is, at its heart, distorted. It
constructs a false sense of the world, one that in turn inhibits the
individual’s ability to engage in productive reflection on that which
surrounds him or her. He or she lacks an elementary comprehension
of things, as well as the tools by which to usefully meditate on them.
And this state of affairs effects an ignorant existence—a life that is
unschooled.17
More deeply, the mistake in thought denies any substantive
character to the individual self and the other and, thus, precludes the
possibility of a life with meaningful relations. In understanding self
and other as, again, a locus of calculation for the satisfaction of
interest and an item for consumption, the cultural form of economics
makes sense of each in wholly secondary terms. It does not recognize
either as having its own integrity, at least not substantively. It sees
each strictly as an epiphenomenon—an expression of something else,
namely interests and its concerns. This approach to self and other, a
denial of self and other qua self and other, means that in the world of
economics there is no self and no other. And this state of affairs in
turn precludes the realization of a life with meaningful relations, as
the possibility of such a life presupposes both self and other—
meaningful relations in life always manifesting themselves in a
movement beyond the former to the latter.18
The first step in understanding the influence that the cultural form
of economics has on contemporary American society is the
explication of the cultural form itself. The next step is an account of
its actual manifestation. It is the expression of the cultural form of
Summers’s famous statement, see Let Them Eat Pollution, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8–14,
1992, at 66 (reprinting memo of then-World Bank Chief Economist Larry Summers).
For Lutzenberger’s response, see FRANK ACKERMAN, POISONED FOR PENNIES: THE
ECONOMICS OF TOXICS AND PRECAUTION 21 (2008).
17. In using the terms “uneducated” and “unschooled,” my intention is not to
patronize. My hope is that the reader can move past this connotation and take up the
vocabulary on its own terms. Additionally, I understand the term “educated” to
reflect at least two characteristics: that one has learned how to understand and think
about the world, and that one has a certain moral education.
18. There is a limit on the types of others with whom or which we can connect
(but they are not limited to human or even sentient beings).
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economics in political space that is the measure of the place it
occupies in American society and thus, that which ultimately allows
us to comprehend its hold on America today. To what extent, then,
do Americans take up the cultural form of economics?
Correspondingly, to what degree do its central pathologies realize
themselves?
In America today, the degree of engagement with the economic
mode of being is significant. That is, Americans embrace the cultural
form of economics in a wide variety of areas of political life. In turn,
the principal unhealthy features of the cultural form of economics are
appreciably manifest. A brief description of some of the areas of
political life in which Americans embrace the cultural form of
economics provides a general sense of the depth of engagement. In
parallel, a short account of the associated pathological expression
provides a basic appreciation of the extent to which the main
unhealthy features of the cultural form of economics present
themselves.
To begin, an initial space in which Americans bring to bear the
economic mode of being is their relationship to nature. To a rather
significant extent, Americans understand a market—in which they
appropriate objects for consumption—to be in place in, and to
govern, this area of political life. Indeed, Americans’ ordering of this
dimension of political living is often organized in conjunction with
just this disposition. An understanding of the environment as a
resource and a commitment to market coordination of its utilization
strongly influences consideration of environmental policy.19 A similar
situation obtains with respect to the American orientation toward
non-human sentient beings (one that, accordingly, does not recognize
a dignity about such beings).20
Moving on from their relationship to nature, Americans embrace
the economic way of life in their approach to one another. In a fairly
robust way, Americans again recognize a market—in which they
acquire their object of interest—to order this dimension of political
living. Their conceptualization of the relations makes this fact clear.
At a general level, Americans engage in “relationships” with one
19. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); see also David M.
Dreisen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun Wedding:
Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21 (2008) (describing the
significance of “market liberalism” to environmental policy, nationally and globally).
20. See, e.g, PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: THE DEFINITIVE CLASSIC OF
THE ANIMAL MOVEMENT 95–157 (Harper Collins Publishers 2009) (1975).
THE
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another. Meanwhile, in the more specific context of their romantic
pursuits, Americans participate in a “dating market” and enter into
marriages that are modeled on a contract for services.21
In line with this approach to one another, Americans also take up,
or at least are beginning to take up, the economic mode of being in
their thinking about the constituent elements of the body. In a
noticeable manner, Americans reflect on the propriety of a market
ordering of this aspect of political life, as relatively recent actions
demonstrate. In 2003, Congress held hearings on a market-based
approach to the exchange of bodily organs.22 Consistent with this
legislative activity, academic scholarship is now exploring this
subject.23
Turning in a different direction, Americans further take up the
economic manner of living in their interactions with social
institutions.
Increasingly, Americans yet again understand a
market—in which they obtain their items of interest—to govern this
aspect of political life. And, importantly, the relevant range of social
institutions is not small. More and more, Americans approach the
press, the medical establishment, universities, even the military to an
extent, in market terms, considering each to be a provider of a
consumer good—and, in turn, each understands itself, and operates,
as a commercial enterprise.24 For example, the press is organized
around “what sells” to the consumer25 and news bureaus are
approached as profit-centers.26
Finally, looking along a slightly more broad axis, Americans
engage the economic way of life in their approach to the community
21. See, e.g., The Dating Market, ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2007),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2007/03/the_dating_market; Katherine
Bindley, Banker Seeks Beauty: Must Be Upbeat Like the Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2009.
22. Assessing Initiatives to Increase Organ Donation: Hearing Before the H.
Subcom. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
108th Cong. 51–57, 64–67 (2003) (statements of Rich DeVos, Dr. Robert Sade, and
Dr. Francis Delmonico).
23. For a reading that explores, in part, a market-based approach to kidney
exchange, see WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING
KIDNEY DONORS (Sally Satel ed., 2008).
24. See, e.g., TOM FENTON, BAD NEWS: THE DECLINE OF REPORTING, THE
BUSINESS OF NEWS, AND THE DANGER TO US ALL (2005); DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES
IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2004);
James Glanz, Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
2, 2009, at A10.
25. See, e.g., FENTON, supra note 24, at 4.
26. See, e.g., id. at 54–57.
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generally. In an increasingly pronounced manner, Americans project
market rule—the pursuit of self-interest—on such affairs. Their
behavior in regard to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is perhaps
most illustrative of this circumstance. With respect to each war, many
did not live, or are not living, the conflict.27
Corresponding to the embrace of the cultural form of economics in
each of these areas of political life is the coincident manifestation of
the mode of being’s central pathologies of the soul. With respect to
the initial pathology—the problematic disposition toward that which
surrounds the individual and the ignorant existence it effects—in each
instance of engagement, the accompanying adoption of the economic
understanding of self and other—in context, the self qua choicemaking appropriator of nature, other persons, the constituent
elements of the body, social institutions and the community generally,
and the associated other as commodity—translates into a basic
misunderstanding about the world as well as of how to think about it
and, accordingly, to an uneducated existence. As the earlier analysis
would lead one to expect, fairly considered, none of these
conceptualizations is compelling. Self and other are not any of these
things, at least for the most part. To see them in these ways is to
embrace a mistake in thought, one that expresses a fundamental
confusion about the nature of things, a lack of an ability to
productively reflect on the world, and, ultimately, the maintenance of
an unschooled life.
With respect to the deeper pathology—the lack of
acknowledgement of the substantive character of self and other and,
consequently, the prevention of the opportunity for an existence with
meaningful relations—the adoption of the economic mode of being’s
understanding of self and other—again, in context, the self qua
choice-making appropriator of nature, other persons, the constituent
elements of the body, social institutions and the community generally,
and the associated other as commodity—does deny self and other qua
self and other and, thus, does preclude the possibility of such a life, at
least in these dimensions of living. Stated directly, to see self and
other in these fashions—to embrace this mistake in thought—is to
reject the integrity of each and, accordingly, to foreclose the
opportunity to move beyond the self and connect with the other, as
27. See, e.g., John Nagl, Op-Ed, Does Military Service Still Matter for the
Presidency?, WASH. POST, May 25, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/does-military-service-still-matter-for-the-presidency/2012/05/25/
gJQAAAMupU_story.html.
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the various courses of conduct that Americans pursue in these
contexts suggest.28
Importantly, in manifesting themselves, each of these pathologies
has distinct social consequences. That is, incident to their realization
are discrete effects on the daily life of society. Practicing an
uneducated life and practicing one insulated from relations with
meaning inevitably impacts the basic functioning of the political
order, an impact worth noting to fully capture the social condition to
which the American engagement of the cultural form of economics
gives rise and, thus, the hold that the economic mode of being has on
America today. Among other things, the above referenced American
ignorance about the world engenders, or at least strongly helps to
engender, environmental destruction,29 inhumane treatment of
animals,30 a lack of interpersonal commitment, social institutions of
declining quality,31 and a decreased sense of community.32
Meanwhile, the related inability to lead a life with meaningful
relations results in, or at least significantly contributes to, a lack of a
practice of love and correspondingly, a disenchanted and unhappy
citizenry.33
The combined analysis of the cultural form of economics and its
extant social expression affords an understanding of the place that the
cultural form of economics occupies in contemporary America. With
this understanding—that the cultural form of economics has a
significant presence in, and a pronounced, negative effect on,
society—a conclusion about the present social situation follows. It is
not a healthy one and is far from being progressive in the
Enlightenment sense of the term. Indeed, it looks more like social
decay. Against the backdrop of this reality, we can turn to the latter

28. The notion of connecting with the other in the above-specified dimensions of
living requires the qualification of “where possible.” As noted in an earlier footnote,
there is a limit on the types of others with whom or which we can connect (but they
are not limited to human or even sentient beings). See supra note 8.
29. The fact of climate change is one example. For some readings on this subject,
readings that more specifically explore the intersection of economic thought and U.S.
climate change policy, see ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
(David M. Driesen ed., 2010).
30. See SINGER, supra note 20.
31. See FENTON, supra note 24.
32. See Nagl, supra note 27.
33. The recent proliferation of a discourse on happiness is suggestive. For an
initial suggestion of the extent of such work in one area of academic thought, the
social sciences, see Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANNU.
REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 405, 406–07 (2010).
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subjects for discussion: the hope that the cultural form of law affords
Americans in light of where society is today and, correspondingly, the
role that lawyers can play in light of that promise. The remaining two
Parts of this Essay address these matters.
II. THE HOPE OF THE CULTURAL FORM OF LAW FOR AMERICA
TODAY
In parallel with Part I, the discussion of this subject begins with an
explication of the cultural form of law.
The first step in
comprehending what promise law can afford Americans is similarly
understanding what the way of life looks like and, in light of the
purposes of this Part, what principal features of well-being it
possesses that oppose the central pathologies of the economic way of
life. Only if we have a picture of what it means to experience the
world “legally,” one that reveals the way of life’s main attributes of
psychological welfare, can we grasp the potential it holds for
contemporary American society. Not surprisingly, the explication
focuses on four ideas and follows the form of that taken up with
respect to the cultural form of economics, exploring law’s basic
metaphysical and existential orientation, its conception of self and
other, and the central elements of wellbeing that follow therefrom.
Turning to the explication, the cultural form of law begins with the
idea of the sovereignty of the People. For the legal way of life, the
People reign. The People possess a transcendental character and
stand as a sort of supreme authority over the world.34 The universe
begins with the People, who ultimately order things. For the legal
mode of being, the People govern, and in doing so, provide stability
and guidance to the human interaction.
In exercising its sovereignty, the People “ordain and establish” a
Constitution that puts in place “rules of law,” which include a
mechanism for generating additional rules of law. The People’s
governance occurs in and through this Constitution, applying the
rules of law. The sovereign character of the People, coupled with this
specific character of its governance, points to the second idea that lies
at the heart of the cultural form of law, one that stands as a corollary
to the People’s existential preeminence. For the legal mode of being,
the sovereign People’s orientation toward the application of rules of
34. Cf. PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 27 (1997) (“Individuals exist; communities may exist.
But ‘the people’ occupy a time and space of sovereignty that is not a place into which
any individual can enter.”).
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law means that rules of law have ontological integrity. They exist in
and of themselves and have their own essence. For the legal way of
life, they are “things-in-themselves.”35
In a world in which the People reign and rules of law are
correspondingly reified, we should expect an understanding of self
and other to be constructed in a manner that aligns with these initial
dispositions. In the cultural form of law, they are. The concepts of
self and other resident in the legal way of life reflect its People and
rules of law-centered orientation. Not surprisingly, these concepts
are also basic to the cultural form of law. They represent the third
and fourth foundational ideas.
With respect to the understanding of the self, for the legal mode of
living, the individual is an object of rules of law. That is, the
individual is a person to whom rules of law apply. More precisely, he
or she is a person to whom rules of law definitively apply. For the
legal way of life, there is no possibility that rules of law do not attach
to the individual—that he or she is “above” rules of law. Without
question, he or she is subject to their jurisdiction.36
Reciprocally, if the individual is a person to whom rules of law
apply, then he or she will apprehend the other in terms of his or her
legally regulated behavior. This fact suggests the understanding of
the other to which the legal mode of living adheres. For the legal way
of life, the other is a person, non-human sentient being, or thing with
whom or with which one interacts in accordance with rules of law.
All are persons, non-human sentient beings, or things with whom or
with which one relates legally.
The understanding of the cultural form of law that emerges from
the description of its organizing ideas is that of a way of life oriented
around a popular sovereign and its rules of law and in which self and
other are conceptualized in terms of an overarching rules-of-law
basis. With this picture of the cultural form of law in hand, we can
reflect on its essential character and ask what it is that we see. And
against the backdrop of the analysis of the cultural form of
economics, a critical feature of the cultural form of law reveals itself,
one that suggests the presence of a certain harmony of being. The
legal mode of being maintains an understanding of self and other that
has currency. It sees self and other in a manner that is legitimate as a
matter of reason. As indicated, the legal manner of living approaches
35. Relatedly, they are not rules of men. For a discussion of this characteristic of
rules of law, see KAHN, supra note 6, at 21–23.
36. Id.
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the self in norm-bound terms and the other in the vocabulary of
norm-bound interaction. Each of these conceptualizations is sensible.
At his or her core, the self can be understood as a person subject to
rules of law. Equally, the other can be seen as that to whom or to
which one relates in terms of such norms. Self and other can appear
in a variety of ways. And, in the range of possible forms, each
represents a viable alternative. Accordingly, the legal way of life’s
conception of self and other cannot be said to denote a mistake in
thought.
Two features of psychological well-being—attributes that stand
opposed to the central pathologies of the economic way of life—
follow from this state of affairs. Preliminarily, the adherence to the
conception of self and other does not give rise to a fundamentally
distorted understanding of the world as well as how to think about it
and, correspondingly, allows for the possibility of an educated life. In
approaching self and other as, respectively, the object of the rules of
law’s application and that to whom or to which one relates in terms of
that regulated behavior, the cultural form of law builds a relationship
to reality that is, at its heart, reasonable. It constructs a sense of the
world that has lucidity, one that in turn does not inhibit the
individual’s ability to engage in productive reflection on that which
surrounds him or her. He or she does not lack an elementary
comprehension of things or the tools by which to usefully meditate on
them. And this condition allows for a life that at least may be
schooled.
More deeply, the adherence to the understanding of self and other
acknowledges the substantive character of each and, correspondingly,
allows for a life with meaningful relations. In approaching self and
other as, again, the object of the rules of law’s application and that to
whom or to which one relates in terms of that regulated behavior, the
cultural form of law comprehends each in primary terms—that is, in
terms that acknowledge the substantive integrity of each. Self and
other exist as self and other. Because self and other are affirmed in
this manner, the legal mode of being allows for a life with meaningful
relations. With the cultural form of law, the individual has an
essence, one that he or she can move beyond in connection with the
other.37
To be clear, the various relationships of connection that the
individual might establish—for example, with particular individuals or

37. See supra note 18.
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non-human sentient beings—are not constructed entirely on their
own terms. The individual does not build the relationship of
connection in a purely “free space.” Rather, consistent with the legal
understanding of the self, the rules of law to which he or she is subject
define a background context against which he or she takes it up.
They frame the manner in which he or she engages the other. This
state of affairs has consequences for the substantive character of the
relationship constructed. Specifically, in setting the border within
which the individual interacts with the other, the rules of law place
limits on the set of behavioral possibilities for the individual and,
correspondingly, the range of meanings he or she can experience.
They constrain the types of action in which the individual can engage
and, thereby, the kinds of connections he or she can make. Because
rules of law operate in this restrictive manner, the conclusion that the
legal mode of being allows for an existence with meaningful relations
requires qualification. The legal mode of being does so, but within
the limits of its own terms. The relevance, or practical effect, of such
limits depends on the particular individual involved and the quality of
the connection he or she desires.38
The first step in comprehending what promise the cultural form of
law can afford Americans is its explication.39 Once again in parallel to
Part I, the next step is an account of its actual, which in this context is
to say its historical, manifestation. It is the historical expression of
the cultural form of law in political space that affords a first hand
picture of its practice and thus that which ultimately allows us to see
its promise. To what extent, then, have Americans taken up the

38. The manifestation of such limits is the manifestation of law’s violence. The
classic discussion of law’s violence is Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
39. The above explication of the cultural form of law, and particularly its features
of well-being, is incomplete. In addition to the two features identified, a third feature
of well-being is resident in the cultural form of law. That attribute inheres in the
taking up of the legal way of life itself. Specifically, the practice of the legal way of
life is the practice of living as a member of a community under the sovereign
governance of the People and its normative dictates—living “under the rule of law.”
It is of participating in a specific type of social governance, one that is defined by
popular governance. In turn, it is of taking part in a collective project, one that
extends across time and across generations and, correspondingly, provides a history
and an identity to the self. In sum, it is the practice of political community, with all of
the richness that other practices of political community provide, at least in their
modern form. See, e.g., KAHN, supra note 34. Because this Essay focuses on the
more immediate social consequences associated with taking up the legal way of life, it
necessarily places this attribute to the side of its discourse. In doing so, the intention
is not to minimize the importance of this feature of well-being.
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cultural form of law in the past? Correspondingly, to what degree
have its principal features of well-being realized themselves?
Historically, Americans have extensively embraced the cultural
form of law. Indeed, Americans have placed it at the center of their
political lives. The legal mode of being has been the principal, albeit
not the only, form of American engagement of the political order.40
In turn, its main attributes of psychological welfare have traditionally
manifested themselves throughout that order. A brief description of
the historical landscape of American political life provides a general
sense of the comprehensiveness of the past engagement. In parallel, a
short account of the associated expression of well-being provides a
basic appreciation of the complete extent to which the cultural form’s
principal healthy features have presented themselves.
To begin, as indicated, Americans have traditionally brought the
legal mode of being to bear on their political life. That is, as a general
historical matter, Americans have understood the People—to whose
rules of law they conform their behavior in relation to the world that
surrounds them—to govern the political order. The Constitution,
along with follow-on legislation, regulations, and judicial decisions,
have determined the standards for behavior in the earlier referenced
areas of political life—the approach to nature,41 other individuals,42
the constituent elements of the body,43 social institutions,44 and the
community generally.45 Similarly, they have established the criteria of
behavior in the various other aspects of Americans’ politics—for
example, the approach to religious affairs,46 foreign affairs,47 covert

40. See generally, KAHN, supra note 34.
41. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7449 (2006) (codifying the Clean Air Act of 1970
and amendments).
42. For an introduction to the American constitutional doctrine of privacy, see
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 555–91, 600–
14 (15th ed. 2004). Parenthetically, it is a mistake to think that privacy is not an
inherently political concept. Indeed, the construction of privacy is “a contestable
political move.” KAHN, supra note 34, at 83.
43. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274g (2006). For an introduction to the American
constitutional jurisprudence of the related subject “the right to die,” see SULLIVAN &
GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 614–29.
44. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 1461–1502 (describing the
American constitutional jurisprudence of freedom of the press).
45. E.g., 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–473 (2006).
46. For an introduction to the jurisprudence of the Constitution’s religion clauses,
see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 1504–1606.
47. For an introduction to the American constitutional jurisprudence concerning
foreign affairs, see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 354–60.
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affairs,48 the family,49 the uses of the body,50 and business relations.51
Regardless of the political space at which one might look, this same
situation obtains.
The People’s rules of law have dictated
requirements of conduct in that area of political life. Popular rule has
reigned in that political space.
Corresponding to the historical American embrace of the cultural
form of law throughout their political life has been the coincident
manifestation of its central features of well-being. With respect to the
initial feature of well-being—a lucid disposition toward that which
surrounds the individual and the possibility for an educated existence
it effects—with the comprehensive engagement, the accompanying
adoption of the legal understanding of self and other has translated,
throughout the political order, to a reasonable understanding about
the world as well as of how to think about it and accordingly to an
existence pointing in the direction of an educated life (which is not to
say that such a life has been realized). As the earlier analysis would
lead one to expect, fairly considered, the various particular
conceptualizations that arise—for example, the self qua object of
rules of law’s regulation with respect to nature, other individuals, the
constituent elements of the body, etc. and the associated other as the
object of interaction—are compelling. Self and other can be
understood as each of these things. To see them in these ways has
been to embrace a legitimate thought, one that expresses a sensible
understanding about the nature of things, does not inhibit the ability
to productively reflect about the world and maintains the path of a
learned life.
With respect to the deeper feature of well-being—the
acknowledgement of the substantive character of self and other and,
consequently, the allowance for a life with meaningful relations—the
adoption of the legal mode of being’s understanding of self and
other—again, for example, the self qua object of rules of law’s
48. E.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 401–442a (2006). For related executive orders, see, e.g.,
Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(2006).
49. For an introduction to the American constitutional jurisprudence concerning
family relationships, see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 591–600.
Additionally, a dramatic example of law’s reach into the family is the criminal law’s
traditional unwillingness to acknowledge a husband’s rape of his wife. See, e.g,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962) (establishing the precondition for rape as “[a]
male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife”).
50. See supra note 42.
51. The range of laws structuring business relations is wide. For an introductory
discussion, see ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 30–32 (1986).
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regulation with respect to nature, other individuals, the constituent
elements of the body, etc. and the associated other as the object of
interaction—has been to recognize self and other qua self and other
and, thus, to make possible a life with meaningful relations
throughout political space.52 Stated directly, to see self and other in
these fashions—to have embraced this legitimate thought—has been
to affirm the integrity of each and, accordingly, to allow one to move
beyond the self and connect with the other.
Importantly, in manifesting themselves, these central features of
well-being have had concrete social effects. As with the main
pathologies of the soul of the economic way of life, incident to their
realization have been discrete effects on the daily life of society.
Practicing in the direction of an educated life and practicing one that
allows for meaningful relations with the other has inevitably impacted
the basic functioning of the political order, an impact worth noting to
fully capture the social condition to which the American engagement
of the cultural form of law has given rise and, thus, the hope that the
legal mode of being affords Americans. Among other things,
American understanding about the world has given rise to at least
some degree of basic health within the political order. For example, it
has led to environmental protection,53 compassionate treatment of
interpersonal
commitment,55
high-quality
social
animals,54
56
57
institutions, and a strong sense of community, at least at times.
Equally, it has led to a more sympathetic structuring of business
relations, at least during some periods in American history.
Meanwhile, the ability to lead a life in connection with the other has
resulted at times in a practice of love and, correspondingly, a more
fulfilled citizenry.58
Of course, basic political life in America has not been without its
problems and imperfections. Indeed, it is doubtful that it could
52. The notion of connecting with the other throughout political space requires
the qualification of “where possible.” As noted supra, there is a limit on the types of
others with whom or which we can connect (but they are not limited to human or
even sentient beings). See supra note 18.
53. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7449 (2006) (codifying the Clean Air Act of 1970 and
amendments).
54. Among other examples, the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals (ASPCA) was founded in 1866. Information on the ASPCA is available
at http://www.aspca.org/.
55. See, e.g., TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION 231–68 (1998).
56. See, e.g., FENTON, supra note 24, at 52–53, 54–55, 58.
57. See BROKAW, supra note 55.
58. See id.

ANAND_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/15/2013 5:48 PM

RESISTING COMMERCIALISM

389

survive a moral critique.59 The historical treatment of blacks and
women, among other groups, immediately suggests just some of the
reasons for questioning this possibility. Nonetheless, the realization
of these central features of well-being has produced an overall
positive concrete condition, at least at times. The history in this
regard is not one of a consistently negative circumstance.
The two steps taken provide an understanding of the hope that the
cultural form of law affords Americans. With this understanding—
that the cultural form of law offers the hope of an alternative to the
economic mode of being, one that effects a more positive social
circumstance—a conclusion about the quality of this promise follows.
It is not an unhealthy one, and is at least a step on the path of a sound
social existence.
III. THE ROLE FOR THE LAWYER IN AMERICA TODAY
In light of the promise that the cultural form of law affords
Americans, the understanding of the role of the lawyer in America
today is straightforward. His or her function is to help realize the
hope of the cultural form of law, and to push against the
manifestation of the cultural form of economics and its negative
consequences for society. That is, he or she is to act to express the
cultural form of law and the social situation to which it gives rise, and
to resist the expression of the economic universe of understanding
and the social order it effects. As the representative figure of the
cultural form of law, his or her professional responsibility naturally
takes this form.60
This role of the lawyer has a variety of general and specific
obligations associated with it and, unsurprisingly, their account lies
beyond the bounds of this Essay. It has also been taken up
elsewhere, at least to some significant extent.61 One question about
the obligations of the lawyer, however, features prominently in

59. On the relationship of political life to moral life, see Rakesh K. Anand, Legal
Ethics, Jurisprudence, and the Cultural Study of the Lawyer, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 737,
767–72 (2008) [hereinafter Anand, Legal Ethics] and Rakesh K. Anand, Advancing
the Cultural Study of the Lawyer: Developing Three Philosophical Claims and
Introducing a New Comparative Normative Inquiry, 3 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 107, 131–
35 (2010) [hereinafter Anand, Advancing].
60. For an account of the relationship between law, lawyer identity, and lawyer
professional responsibility, see Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 59.
61. See Anand, Advancing, supra note 59, at 131–35; Anand, Legal Ethics, supra
note 59, at 767–72; Rakesh K. Anand, The Role of the Lawyer in the American
Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611 (2009).
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discussions about the practice of law today, a question that also
directly intersects with this Essay’s discussion about the growing
influence of the economic way of life and how we should think about
law and lawyers as a result of this circumstance. Accordingly, a brief
commentary on the associated subject matter is appropriate. The
question concerns the organization of the profession and, more
specifically, the rearrangement of the profession in light of the
present state of the national economy. How is the profession to
structure itself given the extant environment and the realities
associated with it?
Obviously, the subject matter is complex and there is much to say
about it. Against the backdrop of this understanding of the role of
the lawyer, however, one point requires highlighting. The inherent
nature of the role of the lawyer speaks directly to this query. That is,
it answers the question presented, at least in the first instance.
Specifically, the responsibility to help realize the promise of the
cultural form of law signifies that a boundary exists within which any
course of action is to be pursued. In confronting the challenges of the
prevailing economic conditions in the United States, the legal
profession must maintain a commitment to the legal way of life and
the manner in which it organizes and understands experience. It must
remain “legally” oriented and address the economic circumstances of
the country from within this perspective.
Importantly, this boundary to conduct permits a wide array of
action. To the extent that various parts of the profession need to
restructure themselves, a broad range of possibilities is available to
legal professionals. Certainly, many of the commonly discussed paths
fit within the requisite parameter of conduct, at least on their own
terms. For example, private law firms are free to provide more
technologically sophisticated services, as well as to expand the array
of legal services they provide and the set of individuals to whom they
provide those services. Equally, law schools may adopt curricular and
classroom changes that focus on foundational skills instruction (for
example, how to read a case, how to read a statute, how to think
conceptually, how to write quality legal prose, and understanding the
importance of listening) or on more “practice-ready” skills.62
62. In my opinion, a focus on “practice-ready” skills is problematic. It is an error
to believe that law schools could create a competent practitioner in three years.
Except for the most rudimentary matters, the practice of law is far too complex to
master in such a short period of time. The knowledge, technical ability, judgment,
and cultural competence required to practice successfully, simply at a basic level,
takes several years post-graduation to acquire.
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While the boundary to conduct is not constraining in any overly
burdensome sense, it does place a significant limitation on the
behavior of the profession. Specifically, any reorganization of any
part of the profession must not arise from a commitment to the
pursuit of profit per se. It must not be rooted in a dedication to
profit-maximization. The framework within which the profession is
to behave precludes this type of action because it contradicts the
demand on the lawyer to remain committed to the legal way of life.
To orient oneself around profit-maximization is to organize oneself
“economically.” It is to direct oneself toward the sovereignty of the
market and to take up an interest-based mode of being. It is, then, to
serve the wrong master and embrace the incorrect manner of living.
It is to fail to orient oneself toward the sovereign People and engage
its rules of law-based mode of being.
Precisely because the boundary to conduct places this limitation on
profit-maximizing behavior, certain proposals for the reform of the
legal profession to which some are now giving voice appear to be
problematic. At present, there is a call from some to understand and
organize the legal profession in a manner that is more aligned with its
economic aspects. For example, individuals promote the approach to
private law firms as commercial entities and, correspondingly, the
opening up of such firms to outside investment.63 Equally, individuals
argue for law schools to understand themselves in more businessoriented terms64 and in turn to adopt curriculums that will produce
graduates that are more market-ready.65 By all appearances, in
making these proposals, these individuals root themselves in a
psychology that accepts profit-maximization as the first principle of
organizational behavior. That is, the authors of these propositions
seemingly begin from an embrace of the pursuit of profits as the axis
of orientation around which to think about the structure of the legal
profession. In doing so, these voices for reform necessarily reject the
63. See Larry E. Ribstein, Want to Own a Law Firm?, AMERICAN (May 30, 2007),
http://www.american.com/archive/2007/may-0507/want-to-own-a-law-firm; see also
Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749 (2010).
64. See, e.g., William Henderson, The Hard Business Problems Facing U.S. Law
Faculty, NAT’L L.J.’S L. SCH. REV. (Oct. 31, 2011), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/
lawschoolreview/2011/10/the-hard-business-problems-facing-us-law-faculty.html.
65. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, The New Math of
Legal
Education,
ABA
YOUNG
LAWS.
DIVISION
(July
2008),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/young_lawyer_home/young_lawyer_archive
/yld_tyl_july08_morriss.html; Karen Sloan, What Is Law School For, Anyway?,
NAT’L L.J.,
Jan.
16,
2012,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202538352545.
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boundary to conduct within which the legal profession can
legitimately respond to the extant economic situation. Accordingly,
their proposals are not viable paths of change for the legal profession.
Instinctively, at least some of these individuals may question the
“practicality” of this preclusion on profit-maximizing behavior,
presumably asserting that such a prohibition on lawyer behavior is
not realizable in today’s economic times. It is hardly clear that such
an argument is tenable, both in the direction of intelligibility and
functionality. On the one hand, the history of the legal profession is
not one of fundamental commercialization. The non-private firm
elements of the profession have not historically been run as
businesses. Nor have private firms always understood themselves in
this manner, at least not wholly.66 On the other hand, to the extent
that the legal profession has increasingly aligned itself along
commercial lines, a concrete path for reversing this trend appears
available. A not insignificant number of economists today predict
that in the medium to long term, inflation will arise in the United
States. To the extent that this situation occurs, the profession can
affirmatively “not inflate”—or at least inflate at a rate that is
appreciably less than that which becomes resident in society as a
whole.
Like most in the United States, the legal profession is subject to the
economic realities of today. In reacting to them, the legal profession
must remain grounded, and stay tied to the role it is to play in
American political life. The cultural form of law offers the hope of a
different mode of being than the economic, one that affords a more
positive social condition. The role of the lawyer is to help realize that
prospect.
CONCLUSION
Today, the social order in America is neither in a healthy state nor
heading in a positive direction. Law represents a medium in and
through which to help reverse this state of affairs. Correspondingly,
lawyers have a role to play in realizing that change of circumstance.
Understanding the situation in which one finds oneself is a useful, and
arguably necessary, condition for responsible action. From this
perspective, awareness of each of the above facts is the starting point

66. See, e.g., SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED
PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
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for improving the American social condition.
required.
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